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Abstract. There is “no such thing as free (non-ideologically constrained) 
speech; no such thing as a public forum purged of ideological pressures or ex-
clusions”. Stanley Fish’s famous thesis (1994) is illustrated by this case study 
on the public debate on freedom of expression in the Netherlands during the 
first decade of the 21st century.
Far from serving tolerance or minority rights, as originally intended, it 
produced a whole line of argumentation that have excluded many from the 
public debate and filled it with a more exclusive content, especially regarding 
religion in general and Muslims in particular. 
A renewed identification with the toleration discourse would help the me-
dia in regaining their public role and will be helpful for journalists covering 
the debate.
Keywords: freedom of expression, freedom of speech, free speech, press 
freedom, freedom of religion, secularism, media, journalism.
Introduction
This paper presents some of the findings of a Dutch research 
project on the changed interpretation of freedom of expression in 
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the Netherlands. In 2010, a corpus of ten years of media coverage 
of a national debate on free speech and the freedom of expression 
was analyzed and conceptualized, showing a remarkable shift in the 
interpretation.
Some of these findings might serve a wider interest, especially since 
some of its core events attracted the international media attention as 
well. The debate on the freedom of expression took place in a decade 
that was marked by two political murders, the stormy careers of popu-
list politicians like Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders, and a supposed 
clash between the Western values and Islam as propagated by Ayaan 
Hirsi Ali. 
The paper concludes with some practical advice for the media in 
general and journalists in particular, in the hope that the debate on the 
freedom of speech will resume its rightful place in the wider tradition of 
the discourse on toleration. 
1. Theoretical framework, or disambiguation
In this paper’s title, I’m referring to the freedom of expression for 
good reasons. Yet there are a number of other freedoms and related 
terms that, as a start, we should mention as well. 
We all know the process from Wikipedia’s disambiguation practice, 
and I propose to ‘disambiguate’ the concept of freedom of expression 
by placing it loosely in its wider theoretical context.
Apart from the freedom of expression, we find the freedom of 
speech, the freedom of information, the freedom of thought, the free-
dom of conscience, the freedom of religious expression, and freedom 
of religion, and of course also the freedom of the press and/or press 
freedom or media freedom, to mention the ones that are even closer to 
the heart of our profession.
Press freedom
To start with the latter, I’m not primarily thinking of the freedom 
of the press, the one specific form of freedom that often concerns us, 
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journalists, most. Broadly speaking, the freedom of press tends to be a 
far more institutional concern than the freedom of expression. As such, 
it often follows its own logic. The outcome may occasionally be almost 
the opposite of the freedom of speech or expression. 
Originally, in Europe, especially in the 19th century, the freedom of 
the press used to be more or less identical with the freedom of speech, 
and many propagated it – or turned against it – for exactly this reason. 
Nowadays, however, the freedom of the press is often more strongly 
tied to property rights and the privileges of free-market capitalism 
than to citizens’ rights and the freedom of speech. In some instances, it 
serves the interests of powerful media conglomerates controlled by the 
likes of Sylvio Berlusconi or Rupert Murdoch far better than those of 
individual citizens. 
In specific cases, the freedom of the press might therefore give room 
to the practices that are exactly the opposite of what the freedom of 
speech or expression stands for. Widely criticized examples of the use 
of press freedom for the sake of special interest or even propaganda are 
presented by the American Fox News network (Brock et al., 2012) and 
in the British popular press. 
The latter were the subject of the Leveson Inquiry in 2012, follo-
wing the News of the World phone hacking scandal. The Leveson Report 
revealed cases in which individual citizens’ rights and their freedom of 
expression were indeed curtailed by the media practices defended in 
the name of press freedom (Leveson, 2012). Of course, there’s much 
more to be said about the advantages and disadvantages of the freedom 
of the press, but this will suffice to conclude that these types of freedom 
are not simply identical as sometimes assumed (Carlsson, 2013).
Other freedoms
That leaves us with a handful of other related rights and types of 
freedom already mentioned, especially the freedom of information, 
thought, conscience, and religion. To jump straight to the other end of 
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the spectrum, the question is, of course, whether the freedom of reli-
gion and religious expression should be mentioned here at all. 
Historically speaking, the freedom of religion is closely associated 
with the freedom of conscience. It used to be a central concern in the 
debate on toleration that took place in Europe and elsewhere over the 
past few centuries (Nussbaum, 2012). In the recent times, however, the 
debate seems to have shifted toward a bigger emphasis on the freedom 
of speech or expression, even at the cost of the freedom of religion. In 
some instances the freedom of religion and the freedom of religious ex-
pression are regarded as obsolete. Some argue that they are better ‘re-
placed’ by the freedom of expression which is seen as a more central 
concern to modern democracy (Akkerman, 2005).
Yet this is exactly the reason why we should include the freedom of 
religion here as well. In the public debate on the freedom of speech and 
expression as it has evolved in the Netherlands during the last decade, 
religion and the freedom of religion play a major role, and arguments 
concerning the first are indeed very often tied to the arguments pro 
and con the latter. In short: no discussion of the freedom of speech 
and expression can exist without a stance concerning the public role 
of religion and freedom of religion (Snel, 2010). We’ll return to this 
debate further on.
The Danish religious freethinker Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855) 
reportedly stated that people demand  freedom of speech  as a com-
pensation for freedom of thought, because thinking would require a 
stronger effort than merely expressing oneself. Kierkegaard obviously 
regarded the freedom of thought as a rarer phenomenon than the free-
dom of expression, but in generally acknowledged theory it is rather the 
other way round. The freedom of thought is commonly considered the 
matrix, the indispensable condition on which nearly every other form 
of freedom rests. 
As such, it has something in common with the equally comprehen-
sive freedom of information. After World War II, an attempt was made 
in the United Nation circles to stress the freedom of information that 
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would apply to all citizens of the UN family of nations (De Jong, 2000). 
Since then, it has found its way in access to information laws and regu-
lations of many modern states and even, more recently, international 
institutions like the European Union (2001). Nowadays, the freedom 
of information typically refers to the Internet and information techno-
logy, e.g., the ability to access content on the Web without censorship or 
other restrictions (Morozov, 2011).
‘Western values’
The term that was used in the recent public debate in the Nether-
lands, however, was ‘vrijheid van meningsuiting’ which best translates 
as freedom of expression. In the Anglo-Saxon world, the freedom of 
speech might be the more common nomer, but the freedom of speech 
and the freedom of expression are generally used as synonyms and refer 
to the same political right (Steel, 2012). Namely, the right to commu-
nicate one’s opinions and ideas freely, regardless of the medium used. 
The freedom of expression is understood as a multi-faceted right that 
includes not only the right to express, but also to seek, receive and dis-
seminate information and ideas. As such, the freedom of expression can 
be considered the most canonical of a modern citizen’s rights, the core 
freedom in the public awareness and a central issue in the current pub-
lic debate (O’Neill, 2004).
It is also firmly based on the international human rights law. Indeed, 
the freedom of expression for each individual citizen is recognized as 
a human right under Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Article 19 of the ICCPR typically states that “everyone shall have the 
right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of fron-
tiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through 
any other media of his choice”. 
Similar formulas are found in Article 10 of the  European Conven-
tion on Human Rights, Article 13 of the American Convention on Human 
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Rights, Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
and in many constitutions. 
This freedom, of course, is particularly important for  journalists, 
given their professional role as the bearers of this general right to the 
freedom of expression for all. This in itself is a sufficient reason for jour-
nalists to pay to it serious attention. The main ground for discussing 
it here, however, lies in its widespread use in the public debate during 
the last decade, discussed in this paper, and the enormous extent of the 
media coverage it received.
The endless series of speech ‘rights and wrongs’, identified in the 
course of this debate, showed that the freedom of expression had grown 
into something beyond its judicial origins. Clearly, the freedom of ex-
pression has come to stand for something more. In the Netherlands and 
elsewhere, the freedom of expression has recently been identified with 
a specific set of cultural values, often considered Western values. It is 
this ‘cultural turn’, far more than its stricter use in terms of law and hu-
man rights, that concerns us here. 
2. Research and results
Empirically, this paper is based on an analysis of the public debate 
on the freedom of expression in the Netherlands over the past decade, 
especially as covered by the media. The outcomes were published in 
Dutch in a monograph in November 2010 (Snel, 2010). Its main fin-
ding was indeed this cultural turn, a rather dramatic shift in the percep-
tion of what the freedom of expression stands for and what it protects, 
that is to say, in the public debate as it evolved in the Netherlands and 
especially in the Dutch media. At the same time, a conceptual analysis 
of the terms and arguments used in this debate tried to make sense of 
them and placed them in a wider perspective. Let me summarize these 
findings.
To start with, the debate on the freedom of expression was fuelled 
by a series of dramatic occurrences that set the tone of the decade – 
even of a new century or a new millennium, for those who prefer to see 
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things at large. First and foremost were the attacks that took place in 
New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. In the Dutch me-
dia, as everywhere else, they led to wide speculation and wild attempts 
to come to terms with these bare facts.
Here, as in many other places in the Western world, ‘Islam’ became 
a new key word in the public debate. Actually, the stress on the reli-
gious and cultural background of a part of the immigrant population 
had already become a topic since the 1990s. Earlier, immigrants had 
been almost exclusively discussed in terms of their social position and 
their socialization. As a matter of fact, immigrants in the Netherlands 
with a Christian background have probably always outnumbered those 
with an Islamic background (especially more identifiable groups from 
Morocco and Turkey), but these newly discovered ‘Muslims’ have been 
dominating the debate ever since. (In the Netherlands, the very word 
“immigrant” evokes spontaneous associations with Islam. Immigrants 
with a Christian background are sometimes erroneously identified as 
Muslims).
Meanwhile, the debate on Islam moved even higher up on the agen-
da. At the same time, the freedom of expression was still no matter of 
special concern. That would change over the next three years when two 
political murders shocked the Dutch public. Even then it took time be-
fore the freedom of expression became associated with Islam and the 
Islam debate. When it happened, the combination proved explosive. 
And the outcome was a complete shift in the meaning and content of 
the freedom of expression, also in its use by most of the media.
Murder of Fortuyn
Two political murders. As both drew the international media 
attention, I think I can refer to them without becoming too provincial. 
The first murder occurred on Tuesday May 6, 2002, just nine days before 
the national parliamentary elections. The victim was Pim Fortuyn, the 
leader of a newly established political party and heading the opinion 
polls at that moment. The murder took place after a radio interview in 
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the Dutch national media center, and the murderer, who almost escaped 
in anonymity but was caught thanks to the alertness of Fortuyn’s 
personal driver, proved a loner, a young environmental activist. His 
motives remained somewhat obscure, but he was clearly triggered by 
the comet-like breakthrough in Fortuyn’s political career and the more 
populist overtones that had come to dominate the political agenda. 
Fortuyn had been openly negative about what he called the ‘back-
ward religion’ of Muslims and the threat Islam posed, according to 
him, to Western values. Values especially under threat, in his view, were 
equality in terms of gender and sexual orientation. Much of his sud-
den popularity had an anti-immigrant motive, and his eloquent defense 
of ‘Western values’ was especially welcome among those who worried 
about the consequences of immigration. Indeed, the international me-
dia generally identified Fortuyn’s new political movement as racist and 
even fascist (Akkerman, 2005).
At the same time, he differed from other right-wing populist move-
ments in Europe in that he himself was openly, even exuberantly, gay, 
that he favored the state of Israel and also Judaism, and that he em-
braced values like ‘emancipation’ and ‘liberation of the individual’ that 
had so far been considered progressive ideals. He adapted them to a 
more right-wing political message, but at the same time these more pro-
gressive political views help explain why he himself couldn’t identify 
with the European extreme-right (Gray, 2004: 169–178).
He was, indeed, a more local phenomenon in that he was also clear-
ly the outcome of the Dutch version of the Cultural Revolution of the 
1960s and 1970s, an episode that is widely credited for the liberation of 
the individual from the bonds of religion and other institutions. In that 
sense, Fortuyn presented his populist and anti-immigrant movement 
with a more progressive agenda, the one that has continued to domi-
nate Dutch politics ever since.
In order to justify his criticism of the ‘backwardness’ and ‘medieval 
religion’ of Muslim immigrants, Fortuyn had successfully introduced 
the phrase ‘freedom of expression’. All of a sudden, freedom of ex-
129
JOURNALISM RESEARCH • Science journal (Communication and information) • 2013 Nr. 6
pression came to stand first and foremost for an open criticism of the 
‘backward’ values and religion of these immigrants and the advocacy of 
‘modern values’ that they were expected to embrace in order to natural-
ize and integrate in the Dutch society. In short, the freedom of expres-
sion was launched as a successful political slogan, the one that would 
dominate the Dutch public debate over the next decade (Snel, 2010).
Murder of Van Gogh
The decisive moment, however, was another murder. On Tuesday, 
November 2, 2004, the filmmaker, publicist and activist Theo van 
Gogh – grandnephew of the painter – was murdered in Amsterdam 
when he was cycling to the film set of 06/05, a film about the mur-
der of Fortuyn. This time, the murderer was a young Muslim, a social 
worker who had recently joined a group of young radical Islamists, and 
his motives were more clear.
In court, he declared he wanted to punish Van Gogh for the blas-
phemy of his short film Submission made in co-production with Ayaan 
Hirsi Ali who had written the screenplay, criticizing the suppression of 
women’s rights by Islam. The submission had been shown on the Dutch 
TV only once, two months before the murder, by a rather progres-
sive broadcasting organization (VPRO). Once again, the distinction 
between progressive, liberal and populist motives proved not easy to 
make, especially regarding Muslims and the consequences of immigra-
tion. The freedom of expression had a special appeal to them all.
After Fortuyn and Van Gogh, the Dutch liberal MP Ayaan Hirsi Ali 
was the third name to receive the international media attention. A for-
mer Somali immigrant herself, she became well-known for her conver-
sion from Islam to an explicit atheist creed and for her outspoken views 
on the clash between women’s rights, secular values, and Islam. Origi-
nally active in the Dutch Labour Party, she crossed over to the conser-
vative-liberal party VVD and was elected in the Dutch parliament. The 
socialists, she declared, were too soft on Islam and should take a firmer 
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stand for the modern values under threat. Indeed, Van Gogh’s murderer 
left a note on the corps threatening her as his next victim, and she was 
heavily guarded ever after.
In 2007, she moved to the United States, made some more interna-
tional media appearances around her memoir Infidel (2007), and then 
slowly disappeared from the Dutch public scene. In the meantime, two 
new events had caused the ‘freedom of expression’ slogan to return to 
the center of public attention once again. 
The first event was an international media hoax well-known as the 
Danish Cartoon Crisis, which started in the Summer of 2005 but came 
to a climax in February 2006 (Klausen, 2009). The second one was the 
sudden electoral success of a new populist and vehemently anti-Muslim 
political party, the Freedom Party led by Geert Wilders, in the Dutch 
parliamentary elections of November 2006. 
Since 2004, indeed in a direct response to the murder of Van Gogh, 
when the Dam Square in Amsterdam filled with a spontaneous mass 
demonstration for the freedom of expression on that very evening, the 
two national preoccupations had become dangerously entangled. Un-
til that day, the freedom of expression slogan on the one hand and the 
debate on Islam on the other had merely co-existed. Literally no one, at 
least in the Dutch media coverage that I studied, had that far suggested 
that Islam and the freedom of expression should be considered natural 
enemies.
From now on, however, this idea turned into an almost nationally 
held conviction. In weeks and months after the murder of Van Gogh, 
thousands of blogs, columns, op-eds and editorials started to explain 
that Islam did not allow for freedom of expression and that this freedom 
was in dire need of a staunch defense. All of a sudden, a mass rally for 
the freedom of expression declared it the ultimate symbol of liberty and 
Western values and the absolute opposite of Islam. From now on, Islam 
was indeed perceived as ‘attacking’ the freedom of expression and all 
Western values it stands for (Snel, 2010).
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Freedom versus religion
In short, a sharp cultural turn, mentioned before, had taken place in 
the crucial year of 2004. No longer primarily a judicial term from the 
context of law and human rights, the freedom of expression had grown 
into a powerful symbol of something far more important. Its suggested 
polar opposition to a complete world religion turned it into something 
very big indeed, the core of liberal democracy, modern values, even 
Western civilization at large.
No, I’m not exaggerating. This is exactly what two influential Danish 
politicians, both former Social Democrats, concluded from the Dan-
ish Cartoon Crisis. In their bestseller Islamists and Naïvists from 2006, 
translated in a number of languages including Dutch, they stressed the 
central importance of the freedom of expression as the ultimate line of 
defense of all Western modern values under threat by ‘totalitarian’ ten-
dencies within Islam ( Jespersen, Pittelkow, 2006).
It is an argument that could be found anywhere in the Dutch media 
in these years, and the partial acceptance of this line of thought helped 
legitimize the more outspoken anti-Muslim campaign by Geert Wilders’ 
Freedom Party. Another film release by Wilders in 2009, Fitna, led to a 
law suit that was widely considered a test on the limits of free speech 
and the freedom of expression. He won the parliamentary elections of 
2010, joined the new government coalition and also won this law suit 
in the Court of Amsterdam which concluded – quite ingeniously – that 
his attacks hadn’t been aimed at Muslims but only at the religion. 
Religion and the public role of religion had indeed in the meantime 
become a major object of concern. For some, it wasn’t just Islam that 
posed a threat to modern Western values, but religion as such. A more 
secularist variant placed all religion under suspicion (Gray, 2000). The 
Amsterdam-based cultural anthropologist Oskar Verkaaik, who had 
been doing research in Pakistan in previous years, compared the new 
self-proclaimed ‘liberal’ culture that had in the meantime become dom-
inant in the Dutch society, with Islamic nationalism in Pakistan. 
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In both countries, he observed, a dominant morality produced a 
new national self-consciousness, even a new type of nationalism that he 
coins neo-nationalism. Islamist tendencies in Pakistan were nearly mir-
rored by their secularist counterparts in the Netherlands. The freedom 
of expression was indeed used as a slogan, a central symbol of this ‘lib-
eral’ and secularist morality that had come to dominate the public de-
bate. As such, it stood in opposition not only to Islam, but to all religion 
considered to represent the forces of backwardness and dependency. 
Verkaaik concluded that the recent Dutch history had created a 
scheme that places ‘religion’ in direct opposition to ‘freedom’. This 
polar pair, freedom versus religion, the modern individual’s liberation 
and emancipation versus the forces of the past, provided the dominant 
frame of thought for both populists and progressives, and helped ex-
plain the almost uncontested popularity of the freedom of expression. 
More than a mere symbol, the freedom of expression had come to be 
identified with this recent liberation of the individual from the bonds 
of religion. 
The latter is a reference to the key feature of the Dutch version of 
the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s. Namely, the complete 
breakdown of the major Christian churches, both Catholic and Protes-
tant, in less than two decades time. This dramatic shift in religious af-
filiation, officially halving church membership between 1971 and 1986 
but in reality a change of a far wider impact, had no international pre-
cedent or parallel. The predominantly Christian culture, that had been 
a major force not only in society and societal organizations, but also, 
since World War I, in politics, had come to a complete standstill (Sen-
gers, 2005).
The outcome was a new national myth that equated the emancipa-
tory liberties of the Cultural Revolution, like individualism, emancipa-
tion and gay rights, with a hard-won liberation from religion. It was this 
scheme the sudden discovery of Islam since the 1990s had to fit in, and 
it helped explain widely held fears of a ‘relapse’ back into the bonds of a 
backward religion. The consequential popularity of the concept of the 
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freedom of expression helped articulate these anxieties about hard-won 
modern values that were held nowhere as deeply as in the Netherlands 
(Verkaaik, 2009).
A liberal jihad
Already in April 2003, one and-a-half years before the murder 
of filmmaker Van Gogh, Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Geert Wilders, at that 
moment both MP for the conservative liberals, published an op-ed 
in the leading newspaper NRC Handelsblad. In it, they advocated a 
‘liberal jihad’ – exactly that term – in order to save democracy and these 
newly won modern values. According to them, a temporary restriction 
of liberal freedoms like the freedom of religion and other fundamental 
rights was acceptable in order to stop the further ‘Islamization’, a threat 
comparable to that posed by totalitarian ideologies like fascism or com-
munism, according to them. 
The idea only took hold in populist circles like Wilders’ own Free-
dom Party. But one element in their liberal jihad received a much wider 
acceptance. The public appearance of Islam gave room to the idea that it 
received too much legal protection from the freedom of religion. Espe-
cially since 2004, pleas to curtail or even abolish the freedom of religion 
and religious expression could be heard both in the academia and in the 
street. 
One reason, no doubt, was the debate on Islam. Another, more fun-
damental, was the generally acknowledged idea that the freedom of reli-
gion had come to stand in the way of the freedom of expression. Again, 
the background was the dominant frame presented here before, of a 
dynamic opposition between newly won rights and liberties against the 
repressiveness of religion, or freedom versus religion. 
Both elements were now considered to be protected by one of these 
two fundamental rights. The freedom of expression was regarded the 
ultimate symbol of the newly-won light of freedom, whereas the free-
dom of religion symbolized the forces of darkness. Of course, these two 
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freedoms were seen to ‘clash’, and a simple and effective way of avoiding 
any future clashes would be to abolish the freedom of religion. Besides, 
many argued, the freedom of religion cannot be regarded as a funda-
mental human right, since it only applies to people with a religion.
Historically and universally, of course, the freedom of religion has 
been used to protect religious minorities of any kind, atheists and 
other secular creeds just as well. But in the specific Dutch situation, the 
concept of “freedom of religion and conviction” – as acknowledged in 
the Dutch Constitution, Article 6 – came to be regarded as a privilege 
for religion and irrelevant for the secular majority. It is a play on words 
and the one that’s not easily solved but, generally speaking, one could 
observe a tendency to charge the word ‘secular’ with a more secularist 
content.
In the Dutch context, the secular state and society were increasingly 
seen no longer as a neutral ground and open to all kinds of convictions, 
but as devoid of any public utterance or the role of religion (Cliteur, 
2010). In short, the ‘secular’ was increasingly interpreted in secularist 
terms, and liberalism came to be identified with secularism to such an 
extent that the two became indistinguishable. As Verkaaik concluded, 
the double political ideology of liberalism and secularism had become 
the new foundation of the contemporary Dutch society (Verkaaik, 
2009). 
In the public debate, the dominant dichotomy of freedom versus re-
ligion is now generally known as one of secular versus religious views. 
In this scheme, the freedom of expression could easily be taken as a 
secular right versus the multiple religious wrongs of the freedom of reli-
gion. This is also the dominant meaning that the freedom of expression 
is assumed in the Dutch media. By and large, the freedom of expres-
sion was now considered a costly good that enables us to push religious 
utterances from the public sphere and by the same logic to reduce or 
abolish the freedom of religion (Snel, 2010).
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3. The main argument
I am well aware that there is a long-standing and honourable tradi-
tion that connects free speech with free thought and free thinking. In 
this tradition, there’s a clear and logical connection between the En-
lightenment ideal of sapere aude, daring to think and speak out indepen-
dently, and a skeptical approach to established religion. The best known 
representative of this tradition is, of course, John Stuart Mill (1806–
1873) who composed his On Liberty on these themes and proposed 
an “absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practi-
cal or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological” (Mill, 1859: 73). It 
became a classical text for the freedom of expression, and rightfully so. 
Yet, this specific philosophical defense of the freedom of expres-
sion should not be mistaken for its only possible content. Basically, the 
freedom of expression is nothing more but what Isaiah Berlin termed a 
negative form of freedom, an empty space that could be filled with any-
thing at choice (Berlin, 1958). Any type of speech or expression could 
be justified by it, whether kind or hateful, wise or folly, secular or reli-
gious – if it weren’t for the law. 
Taken as such, the freedom of expression has no preferences: not 
for any creed or conviction, either liberating or repressive, secular or 
religious. A supposed dichotomy between the freedom of expression 
and religion, let alone Islam, is always a matter of choice – it cannot be 
based on the concept of freedom of expression itself. In another world, 
it could just as easily justify Islamic or other religious utterances par 
excellence, all dependent on the right political and ideological condi-
tions (Fish, 1994).
Seven observations
Seen in this light, it is rather clear what happened with the freedom 
of expression in the Dutch public debate of the past decade. The con-
cept underwent a series of changes that together constitute what I call 
a ‘cultural turn’. In my book, I tried to analyze them in more detail, but 
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here they will be taken together in a sketchy overview of seven tenden-
cies that together constituted it, or seven observations.
First, it is obvious that the freedom of expression moved from a 
more exclusive judicial sphere into a wider cultural space. Before 2001, 
the term had been rarely used in the Dutch media. If it occurred, it was 
always in the context of law and human rights, and mostly referring to 
international situations. You would literally never find it in the popular 
press, as it was considered a too technical, judicial term. That changed 
overnight in 2004 when the use of the term, especially in the popular 
press, exploded and continued to do so in the years to come. With this 
sudden popularity of the freedom of expression it came to be charged 
with new cultural meanings.
Secondly, in an ideal world, the freedom of expression is a complete 
freedom open to anyone willing to make use of it. This ‘negative’ free-
dom, as Isaiah Berlin coined it, came to be filled with more and more 
‘positive’ content. Within a few years time, the freedom of expression 
came to stand for such positive ideals as individual self-expression, 
sexual liberation, gender equality and gay rights, secularism, and libe-
ration from religion. In short, for Western values, as the media would 
echo, or even for the Western civilization as a whole.
In the third place, it turned from an elitist and academic concern 
into one that attracted populists and the popular press even more. After 
2004, when a spontaneous mass demonstration filled the Dam Square 
in Amsterdam on the evening of the murder of Van Gogh, almost all 
pro-freedom of expression demonstrations have been organized by 
Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party and other anti-Islamic groups. From the 
state it found its way into the streets, and from the sphere of law it had 
turned into a slogan, the voice of popular discontent.
Closely related is a fourth turn. In the Dutch context, the freedom 
of expression is a constitutional right based on Article 7 of the Cons-
titution. As such, it is a so-called vertical right: it protects citizens 
from the power of the state, it allows for free expression in this vertical 
relationship between the state and society. In the recent practice, 
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however, it came to be interpreted much more in terms of relations 
among citizens. Pro-freedom of expression demonstrators typically 
criticized fellow citizens like Muslims, or other societal relations. This 
horizontal reading, focusing on the social relationships within society, is 
a characteristic tendency and one that tells us much about the direction 
modern society has taken in the recent years. However, its claims are 
incompatible with the present rule of law. 
It is obvious then, in the fifth place, that the focus of the freedom of 
expression shifted from protecting minorities and minority rights to the 
tendency to advocate the claims of the majority. In the decade under 
scrutiny, a new ‘Moral Majority’ took over and claimed the freedom of 
expression for its own agenda (Verkaaik, 2009). No longer was it con-
sidered a safeguard first and foremost for individuals and minorities, 
but rather the expression of this general will of a new secular majority. In 
a number of cases, minorities were openly advised to accept the demo-
cratic choices of the majority. New was the way in which the freedom of 
expression served to underline this argument. 
The sixth observation concerns a shift in the meaning of the word 
‘secular’ in, e.g., a secular state or a secular society. No longer was the 
secular state seen as a more or less neutral place providing a common 
ground for different worldviews. In the specific Dutch situation, the 
secular state had been the typical outcome of compromise since no po-
litical or other party had ever been in a majority position. Every govern-
ment in the modern history had been based on a coalition of often op-
posed factions, especially Catholics, Socialists, Conservative-liberals, 
and Calvinists. Now, the word ‘secular’ and the idea of the secular state 
came to be ideologically charged with a more secularist content. As a 
direct consequence, a natural opposition between the freedom of ex-
pression and the freedom of religion became an established fact. It was 
taken for granted by most of the media and journalists in this research. 
Seven. Almost as remarkable as the explosion of interest in the free-
dom of expression was the low tide in the debate on toleration, also fre-
quently observed by international visitors. Indeed, when Queen Beatrix 
(who abdicated on April 30, 2013) in her traditional Christmas speech 
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of 2007 referred to the long Dutch tradition of tolerance and toleration, 
her position was vehemently attacked by Wilders’ Freedom Party. Hate 
speech, another typical concern of the 1990s, was also no longer on the 
political and public agenda. In short: if the public interest for freedom 
of speech coincided with a lowering of the interest for toleration, that 
could be explained by the new meanings it had acquired in the mean-
time. Tolerance had come to stand for certain minority interests, like 
gay marriages or sexual liberties, but no longer for others. 
4. Conclusion: toleration in a post-secular world
Let me conclude by pointing at three possible remedies, corrections 
or indeed fresh approaches that could be instrumental in escaping from 
the deadlock. They can be especially helpful for journalists covering the 
debate on the freedom of expression and other related issues, and pro-
vide them with a fresh – preferably critical – look at the many claims 
made in its name. 
In a rightly famous essay from 1994, There’s no Such a Thing as Free-
dom of Speech And It’s A Good Thing, Too, Stanley Fish presented his 
thesis that free speech and the freedom of expression are always a mat-
ter of politics. Both are fundamentally abstract concepts devoid of any 
natural content but filled with whatever content and meaning one ma-
nages to give them. “‘Free speech’ is just the name we give to the verbal 
behavior that serves the substantive agendas we wish to advance” (Fish, 
1994: 102). For journalists, his provocative thesis has a very practical 
consequence. If there is some truth in it, journalists should always be 
aware of the rhetoric and political forces at work in any claim made for, 
or in the name of, the freedom of speech. 
A second fresh look is offered by Jürgen Habermas. Over the last de-
cade, in a series of publications, he has tried to come to terms with the 
unexpected return of religion and religious communities in the public 
life of Western societies since the end of the Cold War. His key concern, 
given the separation of state and church and given the concepts of a 
secular state and secular society, is the role these religious communi-
ties are allowed to play, both in civil society and in the political public 
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sphere. His solution to what he coins the post-secular society and even 
the post-secular world is that, indeed, they should be allowed a public 
role – and that neither the political nor the civil public spheres can be 
sustained without support from all sides, whether secular or religious 
(Habermas, 2006). 
A third fresh approach would lead us back to the natural context of 
free speech and the freedom of expression. Historically, the freedom of 
speech originated in the long search for tolerance and toleration, reli-
gious and otherwise, that have occupied many in Europe since the re-
ligious wars and civil wars of the early modern period. Reaching back 
to its roots in the writings of Milton and Mill, this is what philosophers 
like Onora O’Neill and Martha Nussbaum have found in recent years 
(O’Neill, 2004, Nussbaum, 2012). 
Toleration has probably been the natural environment for the de-
bate on the freedom of expression worldwide till the present day, but 
recently the connection has often been overseen in countries like the 
Netherlands and Denmark. However, it would be a natural thing for 
journalists and journalism educators to link the freedom of expression 
to tolerance and toleration. Just as it would prove their professionalism 
and independence of mind. 
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